pressured into signing the Baruch Plan for the international control of nuclear weapons, was made on at least twelve separate occasions between 1945 and 1949 and was, he later confessed, "the worst thing" he ever said. I This episode, characterized by controversy, proposals, denials and counter-denia ls, and reasonably well discussed by both critics and commentators , has direct relevance to Russell's anti-communist rhetoric.
2 His prescient awareness of the staggering implications of nuclear weapons led him to demand, within two weeks of the destruction of Hiroshima, the urgent implementatio n of some procedure of international control.3
Since the First World War Russell had always maintained a vigorous belief in the long-term necessity of world government. Although this internationali sm had been a central component of Russell's political thought, it had remained at least until 1945, at the level of a political ideal rather than a concrete proposal. In his more pessimistic moods, Russell had maintained that it would only arise through American hegemony, and at all times he had argued that a world government would only be effective if it possessed a monopoly of weapons. 4 Suddenly with the development of the atomic bomb, conditions had changed. Until 1949 the United States had a monopoly of this new monstrous weapon. Despite his very mixed views about both American political ideology and practice, Russell now clearly looked to the United States for international leadership. From the outset he accepted that international control of the bomb may not arise voluntarily. In October 1945 he wrote, "I think a world government supremely important, and I do not expect to see it established without I The twelve occasions are set out in I. F. Stone, "Bertrand Russell as a Moral Force in World Politics", Russell, n.s. I (1981): 7-25. Interview by Cedric Belfrage in the National Guardian, New York, 8, no. 35 (18 June 1956): 6. 2 Clark: D. P. Lackey, "Russell's Contribution to the Study of Nuclear Weapons Policy", Russell, n.s. 4 (1984) : 243-52; Alan Ryan, Bertrand Russell, a Political Lift (London: Allen Lane the Penguin P., 1988): Stone, "Bertrand Russell as a Moral Force in World Politics~'.
l "The Bomb and Civilization", Forward. Glasgow, 39, no. 33 (18 Aug. 1945 ): I, 3. 4 The Prospects for Industrial Civilization (London: Allen & Unwin, 1923) , p. 90, Icarus or The Future of Science (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Teubner, 1924) , p. 63, Which way to Peace? (London: Michael Joseph, 1936) , p. 85.
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an element of compulsion."5 Nevertheless, a mOnth follOWing the United Nations debate on the Lilienthal-Ach eson Plan (later incorpor_ ated into the Baruch Plan) Russell seemed optimistic that the development of the bomb could have beneficial effects: "If the atomic bomb shocks the nations into acquiescence in a system of making great wars impossible, it will have been one of the greatest boons ever conferred by science."6 At time same time Stalin's assertiveness, which first became apparent at Yalta and Potsdam, was beginning to cast a dark shadow over prospects for a stable peace. Within two months of the surrender of Japan Russell publicly called for a defensive policy against Stalinism.? His fear of the extension of the Soviet sphere of influence was not groundless: Communist regimes became established in Bulgaria and Albania in 1946, Poland in 1947, Czechoslovaki a and Romania in 194 8 , and Hungary and East Germany in 1949. Also in 1949 the Communist army finally defeated Nationalist forces in China.
In one sense Russell's position appeared contradictory. Whilst condemning the spread of Communism in tones as forceful as Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, he stiH clung to the ideas of the Baruch Plan as a means to world government and lasting peace. There is evidence that Russel1 genuinely believed that Stalin would, at some point, acquiesce to an International Atomic Development Authority-esp ecially if some pressure was exerted. When it became dear that the Soviet Union had no interest in the proposals, Russell became increasingly despondent and vitriolic in his attitude towards Stalin's Russia. Writing to Einstein in November 1947, he claimed: "I have no hope of reasonableness in the Soviet Government; I think the only hope of peace (and that a slender one) lies in frightening Russia.... Generally: I think it useless to make any attempt whatever to conciliate Russia."8 EarHer that year he had written to Colette in Sweden complaining of the unpopularity of his anti-Stalinist views amongst many of his friends on the Left and declaring that ever since the end of the war he I "Humanicy's Last Chance", Cavalcade, 7, no. 398 (20 Oct. 1945 ): 8-9. 6 "The Atomic Bomb and the Prevention of War", Polemic, no. 4 Guly-Aug.
1946): 15-22.
7 "Britain and Russia", Manchester Guardian, 2 Oct. 1945, pp. 4, 6. 8 Letter to Albert Einstein, 24 Nov. 1947 (RAJ 710). had been as anti-Russian as anyone can be without being regarded as insane. 9
A month before the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 194 8 , Russell thought the conquest of Western Europe by the Red Army to be a strong possibility. In an infamous letter to Walter Marseille, an American professor who shared Russell's "preventative war" views, Russell expressed the fear that following a Soviet invasion "practically the whole educated population will be sent to Labour camps in N. E. Siberia." He argued that "Communism must be wiped out, and world government must be established": "... I do not think the Russians will yield without war. I think all (including Stalin) are fatuous and ignorant. But I hope I am wrong about this."IO Today this reads as a parody on McCarthy-inspired American anti-Communist fanaticism. But it was not. The letter was later published by Marseille-provoking an angry response from Russell who claimed such views had been expressed in private and were not intended for publication.
II
Nevertheless, both publicly and privately, Russell was, by noW, unequivocally fighting as a propagandist on the side of the West in the Cold War. In 194 8 he advised Colette not to stay long in Sweden, otherwise the Russians would get her. 12 In the same year he was invited by the British Council to deliver a series of political lectures in Oslo and Trondheim. The latter is best remembered for the near-fatal flying-boat accident that Russell was involved in. In his autobiography Russell claims that he was sent to "Norway in the hope of inducing Norwegians to join an alliance against Russia" .13 He supported the establishment of NATO in 1949 and argued that the present Russian government was "in the fullest sense of the word, imperialistic"-in contrast to America, which "has never been imperialistic."14 This contradicted Russell's long-held distrust of American foreign policy, which, for 9 Lener to Colene O'Niel, 20 Feb. 1947 On the whole, the two Background books do reflect a more balanced approach to anti-Communist propaganda than some of Russell's earlier fulminations. When theorizing about the meaning of freedom, he accepts that there is a high degree of intolerance in the West as well as the East, although the limitation of freedom is by far at its worst in the USSR. He accepts that laissez-faire principles have failed to secure economic freedom, but on the other hand "socialism in the Russian form does far more to destroy it than was done by capitalism even in its most ruthless days."22 He admits that both the FBI and the Russian secret police restrict personal and ideological liberty, although again the Soviet example is more extreme. Nationalism, he argues, is one of the greatest threats to freedom, and the· Russians' belief in Communism and the Americans' belief in democracy are largely "cloaks for nationalism" (p. 30). Russell also warns that there is a danger of other nations becoming so obsessed by the "Russian Menace" that they neglect their own freedoms. In What Is Democracy? Russell claims that whilst the Russian use of the term "democracy" is "shameless", the witch-hunts in America have also reduced the 
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accountability of the government to the public. He also returns to an old idea of his, first expressed thirty years earlier, that democracy cannot work amongst "uncivilized people" or where there is a high proportion of mixed groups which hate each other. In a more equivocal mood Russell asserts that the West must make the world safe for democracy.
Interspersed with Russell's more balanced reasoning are outbursts of indignant condemnation more typical of mainstream anti-Communist propaganda. Russell clearly saw himself as a key spokesman in an ideological conflict, arguing that "those who have kept alive a knowledge of what it is that makes us prefer Western systems to that of Russia are doing something absolutely necessary to the victory of what they value" (What Is Freedom?, p. 32) . He stresses that the intellectual freedoms present in the West are absent in the East. Despite his teaching experiences in America, including the famous judgment by Justice McGeehan, he nevertheless feels able to state that in "the realm of science the correct intellectual attitude is taught in the West" (ibid.). Russell considers Stalin's foreign policy to be reminiscent of the Czar's and a constant source of danger to Western nations. It is motivated by the political passions which Russell had always claimed to be most dangerous: "a fanatical creed", "a possibility of glory" and "the sheer lust for power".2 3 Writing before the full extent of Stalin's tyranny became apparent, Russell argued that in the matter of liberty, "Soviet Russia is worse than even Nazi Germany" (What Is Freedom?, p. 22) . Russell claimed that if a Third World War comes about, it will be caused by Russian aggression, and in a slightly modified version of his earlier position he argued, "I would resist, at almost any cost, the extension of Soviet tyranny to the Western world; and so long as this menace hangs over us, liberty must have very definite limits" (p. 27). It is, he claimed, up to the Russians to force war upon the West, if they so decide, and if so, the West "must accept the challenge at whatever cost" (What Is Democracy?, p. 39). Russell. argued that the only chance for the improvement in East-West relations lies in reform east of the Iron Curtain. Whilst Communism remains an aggressive ideology, the West must maintain a "defensive hostiliry to such a Power in order to preserve national liberty" (What Is Freedom?, p. 3 0 ) .
It could be argued that these writings demonstrate that not only had Russell abandoned his usual style of political analysis, but that he had also retreated from his socialist radicalism of the post-World War I period, in favour of the defence of Western values above all else. This is not to say that Russell was ever overtly pro-Communist; his views on Communism and Marxism are riddled with confusion, a certain amount of misunderstanding and a fair degree of contradiction. His visits to Germany in 1895 had left him critical of the ideological base of Marxism, and these trips were followed rapidly by his rejection of idealist philosophy. From then onwatds he remained, almost throughout his life, an opponent of Marxist political and economic philosophy.24 But his reaction to the Bolshevik Revolution was hardly unequivocal. Later, during his 1947 correspondence with Einstein, he argued that he had come to his wholly negative view of the Soviet Union when in Russia in 1920, and that all that had happened since had made him feel more certain that he was right. 25 This retrospective gloss was, however, a rather simplified version of his earlier position as developed in The Practice and Theory ofBolshevism (19 20 ) , where he expressed quite mixed views about Russian Communism and accepted that Communism may be a more appropriate form of development for "backward nations". This notion was reiterated in . The Prospects for Industrial Civilization (192 3) . Nevertheless antiStalinism was not a central component of Russell's political writing. The excesses of the regime were not so widely known at this time, and after the outbreak of the Second World War, Russell's growing hatred of the regime was, for patriotic reasons, confined to personal letters. 26
A few years after Russell's most outspoken anti-Soviet activity, the sociologist Irving Horowitz wrote an article on Russell's pacifism in •6 See Russell's lerter to Gilbert Murray, 18 Jan. 1941: "I have no doubt that the Soviet Government is even worse than Hitler's, and it wiIl be a misfortune if it sur· vives" (copy in RA Rec. Acq. 71).
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which he argued that even in his most radical period during the First World War, Russell was critical of the socialist alternative to war. He claims that later Russell came "more and more to see the beauti~s of laisser faire liberalism and the horrors of collectivism" and that "his return to the orthodox fold which originally nurtured him was happily received." To understand Russell, argues Horowitz, "one cannot overlook his station as a foremost spokesman for the imperial lion."27 Horowitz's first criticism is surely incorrect: much of Russell's early political thought was precisely an examination of socialist ideas in a pacifist context. Similarly, his argument that Russell abandoned radicalism and socialism needs to be examined critically-especially in the context of Russell's Cold War writings.
Russell's political thought often defies attempts at classification. Whilst a number of key political ideals remain central, his political writings are often characterized by their eclecticism and contextualism. This period is a case in point. At the same time that Russell was advocating preventative war he was calling for industrial democracy in Authority and the Individual and updating his earlier radical ideas with warnings about uncontrolled growth and destruction of the environment. 28 Whilst his readership could be forgiven for thinking that he had conflated his criticism of socialism and Communism, this was not the case. In What Is Freedom? he praised the greater economic equality facilitated by the British Labour Party, and in What Is Democracy? he called for participatory democracy based on ideological and occupational rather than geographical constituencies. He also argued for a return to the principles of both Guild Socialism and French Syndicalism, which, since the advent of state socialism in the Soviet Union, had, regrettably, been neglected by socialist theorists: "It is time to revive the aims which progressive people set before themselves in the days before the Russian Revolution. It is only in so far as this is done that Western democracy can be sure of remaining democratic" (p. 28).
Horowitz's other contention, that Russell had become part of the establishment at this time, is one that Russell himself later admitted. "By the early part of 1949," wrote Russell, "I had become so respect-'7 I. L. Horowitz, "Bertrand Russell on War and Peace", Science and Society, 21 (1957): 32.
• 8 "Dangers of State Power", The Listener, 37 (13 Feb. 1947 In all Russell's political writings of this period the personality of Stalin casts a permanent shadow on the prospects of world peace. One of Russell's arguments against the Marxist interpretation of history had always been that it devalued the importance of the individual political actor. History would have been very different, he often argued, hadfor example-Bismark never lived. The same applied to Stalin. Russell believed him to be the reincarnation of Ivan the Terrible: insane, and totally evil.3°This contrasts with Russell's views on Lenin and Trotsky, which at this time appear less negative than those expressed in Practice and Theory of Bolshevism in 1920,31 The period around Stalin's death was one of dramatic changes which included the testing of a 29 Auto. 3: 26. Clark suggests that Russell described his activities at this time as "globe-trotting for the Foreign Office" (p. 504).
3°See interview with Belfrage cited in fn. I, and "Stalin's Nightmare" in Nightmares ofEminent Pmom (1954) . See also "Frygt-balance giver ingen sikkerhed", Politiken, Copenhagen, 6 Sept. 1959, pp. 29-30-in British atomic device in 1952, the end of the Korean War in 1953, and most significantly, in the same year, the successful testing of a thermonuclear weapon by the United States. The discovery of the hydrogen bomb had a huge impact on Russell's political thought, and thus it is hard to isolate Stalin's death as being the single most important factor in Russell's transition at this time. Nevertheless it is instructive to note the speed with which Russell changed his position on the Soviet Union following the death of Stalin.
In his autobiography Russell claimed: "I rejoiced mightily in that event, since I felt Stalin to be as wicked as one man could be and the root evil of most of the misery and terror in, and threatened by, Russia" (Auto. 3: 20) . He was asked by the BBC to deliver a lecture on Stalin. In "Stalin's Legacy" he condemned Stalin's regime so vehemently that the talk was never broadcast. However, in "A New Russian Policy" broadcast by the BBC'S Eastern Service in 1953, Russell was more positive, expressing the hope that a solution could be reached over the Berlin problem, that the pace of collectivization could be slackened, and that there could be more religious toleration. By 1954 Russell felt able to say in a published essay that "there are signs that in the course of time the Russian regime will become more liberal" in the Soviet Union, and that the best weapon against Communism· was not war but the reduction of poverty and hatred east of the Iron Curtain,32 At the end of 1954 Russell made his historic broadcast on "Man's Peril from the Hydrogen Bomb" and became increasingly involved in mobilizing opinion amongst scientists against nuclear weapons and Cold War fanaticism. Even before Khrushchev's "secret speech" in 1956, Russell claimed that there had been genuine liberalization in the Soviet Union. 33 In a private letter he argued for a more balanced view of the USSR, claiming that "I think that progressives throughout the Western World have been led down blind alleys by sycophantic adulation or fanatical hatred of the Soviet Government."34
The efforts of Russell and Einstein to mobilize scientists of both if they are to be reprinted, they will require considerable alteration. They were written when Stalin and McCarthy were both going strong. They say many things against Russia which, even when true, I no longer think it useful to say,35
Many of the general criticisms of the Russian regime were revised ,to retrospective condemnations of Stalinism. Russell qualified his argument that Russian aggression would be the cause of the next world war, and omitted several more extreme statements, including the comparison of Stalin and Hitler. Russell also inserted several passages to 35 Letter to Stanley Unwin, 27 Aug. 1960 (RAI 410 (RA 720) , who wrote that Russell had made the statement in a unidentified broadcast. He replied: "I think it is probable that as applied to a few very very rich people in the West my statement may not have been correct. What I was think" ing ofwas some statistics I saw as to such matters as the petcentage difference between the salary of a general and pay of a private which, it appeared, was considerably greater in Russia than in Britain or America. I am sorry that I no longer have the document from which 1extracted this fact and many others of a like nature, but I do think that I ought to have made a proviso excluding the very few super-rich" (26 Nov. for the moment, seem slight, but it exists. and so long as it exists it is our duty to remember the best of the possibilities offered by our distracted
world. ] 101: 30 precarious
